Agenda item

The Chair remarked that it was pleasing to receive a letter of thanks from the Minister of State for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention in relation to Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS) addressing all of the Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry Phase 1 recommendations.

The Deputy Chief Fire Officer (DCFO) presented the report to members summarising the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 and 2 reports including the progress that the Service had made in relation to Phase 1 recommendations and a forward look to the recommendations made under Phase 2.

The DCFO introduced Area Manager (AM) Tom Powell who gave a presentation to members on the Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry.

On June 14 2017, Grenfell Tower, a high-rise residential building in London, was engulfed by fire, tragically resulting in the loss of 72 lives. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry, led by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, released the Phase 1 report on October 30, 2019. The report, comprised of six parts and primarily examined the events on the night of the fire. Despite the scope of Phase 1 being limited to that night's events, it highlighted the necessity for significant improvements in fire safety measures, particularly in the London Fire Brigade's and other Fire and Rescue Services' (FRSs) responses to major disasters, including high-rise fires.

Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service's (LFRS’s) reaction to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 involved receiving and reviewing the recommendations to implement necessary enhancements. LFRS identified 75 actions and categorised these within various themes which included; training, equipment, vehicles, systems, and resourcing. All actions were placed on the services Assurance Monitoring System (AMS) with relevant owners assigned, who provided updates and attached evidence to support progress. The LFRS Organisational Assurance Group, which was made up of stakeholders from across the Service provided oversight and scrutiny on each actions progress and collectively agreed the sign off of each recommendation once satisfied.

All 75 actions relating to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 had been implemented.

There had been a number of legislative changes, the Fire Safety Act 2021 mandated that building owners took responsibility for conducting fire assessments and ensured the safety of residents. LFRS had developed its website to make it easier for building owners to provide critical information such as floor plans and external wall information and made it easier for members of the public to report fire safety complaints, defects or to submit valuable information to assist LFRS during operational incidents.

The service had introduced a Built Environment and Ops Liaison Team which had overseen the implementation of the new legislation and collation and processing of high-rise premises details. LFRS had also introduced the Secure Information Box (SIB) at all high-rise properties including contact details of the responsible person, building layout, residents’ information, current fire safety issues and current evacuation plans.

On 1 October 2022, LFRS adopted a red, amber, green (RAG) risk system to ensure risk was consistently triaged and a proportionate resource response applied.

LFRS had enhanced it’s training approach and worked with Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) to train using their high-rise prop.

Operational policy had been updated in line with national guidance, including Immediate Building Evacuation (IBE), an evacuation strategy which enabled a controlled, safe and effective evacuation of any type of building. IBE was an LFRS response to the need to change the pre-determined evacuation strategy to a simultaneous evacuation. For example, if a Tall Building with a ‘stay put’ strategy started to show unusual fire behaviour such as fire spread up the exterior of the building, the Incident Commander may choose to evacuate the whole building to reduce the risk to life.

LFRS had implemented an electronic system to record Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) information in the control room which displays simultaneously at the bridgehead and in LFRS command units. This improved situational awareness and sharing of information. The evacuation guidance for the building, and the advice provided to specific flats was recorded. Occupants could be re-contacted by North West Fire Control (NWFC) with relevant information and/or if the evacuation strategy had changed.

One recommendation was for Fire and Rescue Services to introduce escape hoods for use by casualties in situations where they were unable to escape due to smoke or its effects. Escape hoods provide a barrier to the inhalation of toxic smoke and gases, which could significantly impair the ability to breathe and see, increasing the risk of harm or death. They typically worked for 15 minutes by providing a clean air supply or by filtering out harmful smoke particles, ensuring that the wearer could breathe more easily and continue to evacuate safely. Every LFRS appliance carried a number of smoke hoods.

LFRS had introduced smoke curtains, a passive fire protection system designed to contain and direct smoke to designated areas preventing it from spreading throughout a building. LFRS had also introduced a male-to-male adaptor to address potential issues with defective riser inlets at high-rise properties. It served as a crucial piece of equipment by enabling the conversion of an available outlet into an inlet, ensuring the functionality and continued use of a dry riser system for firefighting.

The Aerial Ladder Platform (ALP) assets within Lancashire had been reviewed and the service had procured its highest ALP, a 45-metre ladder to enhance LFRS’s response capabilities in line with built environment risks. The cage was adjustable, enabling it to be flush with the building where a rescue may be required. The ALP had wheelchair access and a five-person cage. The ALP could also be operated remotely.

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 was published on the 4 September 2024. The report comprised of fourteen parts, and covered the course of events leading up to the fire; it had 58 recommendations. Although there were fewer recommendations than anticipated, many of the recommendations were broad with significant implications for a number of stakeholders with some requiring legislative change. These stakeholders included: Central Government, Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Council, Tenant Management Organisations (TMO), private companies involved in the design and refurbishment, product manufacturers and those involved in testing materials, and the London Fire Brigade (LFB) in relation to its planning and preparedness.

The recommendations would have significant implications across Lancashire in the short, medium and long term. Although many of the recommendations were not directed at Fire and Rescue Services, they would still have an impact on LFRS such as changes to Building Control processes or how Local Authorities prepare and respond to an incident similar to the fire at Grenfell.

LFRS would review their previous actions under Phase 1 within the context of the Phase 2 recommendations made to LFB and Fire and Rescue Services, to provide additional assurance and identify where further work would be required. The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) were also reviewing the recommendations and LFRS would monitor their updates closely. As with Phase 1, all relevant recommendations would be added to, and tracked on the AMS, with the Organisational Assurance Group providing internal scrutiny and oversight.

County Councillor F De Molfetta remarked that it was pleasing that LFRS had completed all the phase 1 recommendation actions. He felt that the inquiry had dragged on for too long and was disappointed that there were still tower blocks with unsafe cladding. He expressed his thanks to all officers for safeguarding Lancashire.

In response to a question from County Councillor B Yates in relation to the number of high-rise buildings in Lancashire that had unsafe cladding and the equipment available to tackle any potential fires, AM Powell confirmed that a tall building was defined as a building over 18 metres tall. There were over 70 buildings over 18 metres tall in Lancashire and of those, 6 or 7 were in the red RAG risk category which also included non-residential buildings. Resources would be dispatched in line with the RAG risk category, if the building was within the red category more appliances would automatically be sent.

In response to a question from the Chair in relation to escape hoods being carried by firefighters, AM Powell confirmed that escape hoods were attached permanently to breathing apparatus sets and there were more on each appliance.

In response to a further question from the Chair in relation to the timeline for phase 2 actions, AM Powell confirmed that some actions would take a number of years to complete as they may require government to enact changes in legislation. The NFCC were reviewing recommendations and wanted a joined up approach across all FRSs. There was no definite timeline but once established a timeline would be attached to each individual action and tracked through the AMS.

In response to a question from County Councillor M Clifford in relation to where the new ALP would be stationed and if it was where the highest buildings in the county are, AM Powell confirmed that the new ALP would be based at Preston Fire Station. The landscape of Lancashire was changing but Preston had the biggest residential high-rise risk, however there were other areas around the county with risk increasing.

Resolved: - That the Authority noted the report and the contents of the associated slide presentation.