Agenda item

The Assistant Chief Fire Officer presented a report which, following the publication of The Kerslake Report, provided Members with details of Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service’s operational assurance.

The Authority had a legal duty to ensure the provision of a safe and effective Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS) and to contribute to meeting this duty, LFRS undertook a continual process of Operational Assurance, within which operational readiness and operational performance was routinely assured. This process comprised the Service’s ‘Operational Assurance Framework’ within which a range of assurance activities were undertaken by a dedicated Operational Assurance Team, Area based Officers and the Training and Operational Review Department. The Framework was based upon requirements detailed in the Fire and Rescue Authorities: Health Safety & Welfare Framework Document.  The methodology used within the Framework was built around 2 key elements i) operational assurance at incidents and ii) post incident / event learning and support.  Thus in practical terms the Framework aimed to provide a process of continuous improvement through a formalised system of audit and review.  These measures contributed towards making Lancashire safer and the overall attainment of corporate priorities, specifically: ‘Responding’ to fires and other emergencies quickly and competently. 

In an emergency service context ‘assurance’ could be described as the actions that are taken to give confidence that policies, procedures, training, equipment etc all come together to deliver safe and effective emergency response.  Thus, in an LFRS context, we aim to continually ask ‘are we assured that we are operating as safely and effectively as we can be?’

An active and open learning environment had to be something that was embedded and must therefore be an ongoing feature of the operating environment. As the operational environment continually evolved so therefore must the approaches used. It was important that the Service’s assurance processes generated genuine learning from lessons recognised through our own experiences, or from those of others (where we were able to identify improvements that could be made to our own approaches without the need for us to go through that ‘learning experience’ ourselves).

Embedding assurance meant that LFRS truly did learn from our findings and that we had the confidence that the lessons identified became the lessons learnt, and that this approach was underpinned by robust evidence.

The Framework considered the opportunities to learn and improve which existed before, during and after incidents and joined together all three to create a cohesive and continuous cycle of learning and improvement. Although the incident command system was fundamental to safe and effective emergency response, it did not exist in  isolation.  To be successful it must be integrated with other factors such as equipment, training and assessment and the gathering of risk information beforehand.  LFRS took a rounded approach to operational assurance based around 3 pillars: i) operational preparedness; ii) operational response assurance and iii) operational learning.

The publishing of the Kerslake Report was a reminder to everyone in the emergency services that we must review and learn from every incident to ensure public safety.  LFRS response to the Kerslake Report was outlined in the report.  Lord Kerslake had identified a number of areas that went well and a number of major areas for learning including recommendations.

The Chief Fire Officer and wider leadership of LFRS had for many years stressed the need for risk awareness as opposed to risk aversion.  This had led to an operational culture that supported staff who assessed risk, after taking into account experience and core knowledge, and interpreting and adapting policies in the context of the situation in front of them.

An integral part of LFRS Operational Assurance Framework was operational learning and a robust process was in place, to ensure that at both a local [Lancashire], regional and national level this was considered in detail, in the context of LFRS own policies and procedures, and where appropriate acted upon.

LFRS would continue to review its service in light of all recommendations arising from the above, and would make further improvements in the service delivered if required. In practical terms, lessons identified become lessons learned, and this would be no different with the Kerslake Report.

In response to Member questions the Assistant Chief Fire Officer confirmed that the greatest area of challenge in the context of a terrorist attack was the initial lines of communication.  LFRS had met with counterparts in Lancashire Constabulary and had made subtle adjustments to mobilising arrangements with North West Fire Control. 

The Assistant Chief Fire Officer confirmed that the Police were the lead organisation in the context of counter-terrorism and they were cognisant of the expertise of others.

Members were reassured that work was already underway and the Service had, through the Lancashire Resilience Forum with other emergency services and partners, worked jointly to further ensure delays would not happen in Lancashire should a similar incident occur here.

In response to a question regarding the Kerslake report recommendations, the Deputy Chief Fire Officer advised that a former Deputy Chief Fire Officer from Greater Manchester, who was also the former Chair of their local resilience forum acted as advisor to the panel.  The Deputy Chief Fire Officer understood that each person involved had been given the opportunity to provide their considered position to the panel to inform their recommendations.

RESOLVED: - That the report be noted and endorsed.